INTRODUCTION
The debate on the advisability of creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule smoldered for years in the dissenting and concurring opinions of the Supreme Court, 1 only to reach full flame in the pages of criminal procedure commentaries 2 just prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates. 3 Although the promise of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not reach fruition in Gates, 4 advocates of such an exception merely had to wait an additional term of court before their wishes came true. The Court's decisions in United States v. Leon 5 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard 6 created an exception to the exclusionary rule and held that illegally seized evidence could be used in the prosecution's case if police officers seized the evidence "in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." '7 Cases decided after Leon have begun to establish certain patterns and it appears that some of the worst fears of the dissenting Justices in Leon are coming true. 8 Commentators on Leon and Sheppard have brought to held the constitutionality of the issuance of arrest warrants by nonlawyer court clerks, wrongly decided in light of Leon and the unreviewability of constitutional decisions which Leon seems to authorize?
II. LEON AND THE ANALOGY TO MISTAKE OF LAW
A major purpose of the substantive criminal law is to induce external conformity to rules. The purpose of the law is to force compliance with a set of norms. 19 The criminal law achieves this standard setting function mainly through notions of retribution and deterrence.
2 0
The refusal to allow generally a mistake of law defense is seen as necessary so that the parameters of rights will be learned and respected. 2 ' Even if the transgressor is unaware of the illegality or immorality of his act, and consequently is incapable of being specifically deterred from his act by the threat of punishment, the person must be punished so that the proper standard of conduct will be learned and respected by others. 2 2 The criminal law has generally refused to elevate specific deterrence of the individual above its goal of general deterrence and general education 23 and therefore has, in the main, rejected the notion that mistake of law excuses conduct. 24 The exclusionary rule is intended to serve a similar, standardsetting function. In Leon, 2 5 and in cases preceding Leon, 2 6 the Supreme Court held that the sole function of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct and thereby " 'safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.' " 27 Consequently, an analysis of Leon in light of the criminal law's treat-ment of mistake of law should give some insight into the way in which Leon may be applied and limited.
The analogy of the doctrine of ignorance or mistake of law to the good faith exception developed in Leon is not complete, however, because punishment for a violation of a criminal statute is most often addressed directly to the actor and punishment is only rarely imposed in a vicarious fashion. The "punishment" associated with the exclusionary rule is directed against the state and the state is "punished" for the actions of its agent. Only in an incidental way can it be said that the officer is personally punished. 28 
III. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION IN LEON
In its 1984 Term, the Supreme Court delivered opinions in two companion cases which created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The decisions, which eschewed traditional constitutional decision making technique, 2 9 may be intended as harbingers of the ultimate demise of the exclusionary rule in its entirety. 3 0 In United States v. Leon, 3 1 a facially valid search warrant was issued by a state superior court judge. Large quantities of drugs were found in a number of separate locations and seized pursuant to the warrant. 3 2 The evidence was suppressed in "a close case" by the federal district court 33 and the suppression was upheld by a divided 29 It is probable, though admittedly not certain, that the Court of Appeals would now conclude that the warrant in Leon satisfied the Fourth Amendment if it were given the opportunity to reconsider the issue in the light of Gates. Adherence to our normal practice following the announcement of a new rule would therefore postpone, and probably obviate, the need for the promulgation of the broad new rule the Court announces today. Leon, 468 U.S. at 961-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 30 Ten years ago in United States v. Calandra, I expressed [in dissent] the fear that the Court's decision "may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door [to evidence secured by official lawlessness] still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases." Since then, in case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the rule. It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete. That today's decision represents the pice de risistance of the Court's past efforts cannot be doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the prosecution's case in chief of illegally obtained evidence against the individual whose rights have been violated a result that had previously been thought to be foreclosed. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote and citations omitted).
31 468 U.S. 897 (1984 United States and adopted a "totality of circumstances" test. 3 7 The Supreme Court acknowledged that it was within its power to consider Leon under the new "totality of circumstances" test 3 8 and therefore avoid the good faith issue. 3 9 The Supreme Court, however, jumped at the opportunity to create a new good faith exception. The Court in Leon held that the "exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." 40 Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if (1) the magistrate was misled by the affidavit either intentionally or recklessly; 4 1 (2) the magistrate in issuing the warrant "wholly abandon [ 801 (1985) .
In Reivich, the district court first determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The court refused to apply Leon because the officers failed to include information in the affidavit regarding inducements given certain witnesses for their information. " [Detective] Sweeten displayed, at the very least, reckless disregard for the truth of said affidavit." 610 F. Supp. at 545. 42 Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) . The Court cites Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) , as an illustration of intolerable judicial conduct. In Lo-Ji Sales, an investigator presented two reels of"obscene" film from defendant's adult bookstore to the Town Justice in order to procure a search warrant. The Town Justice agreed that the film was "obscene" and issued the search warrant. Id. at 321.
The TownJustice, however, personally accompanied the officers to the bookstore to
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reasonably trained officer would rely on the warrant; 4 3 or (4) the warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. ' 44 In order to understand the good faith exception and the four exceptions to the exception, it is necessary to understand the Supreme Court's view of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Justice White, writing for the majority, debunked the notion that the exclusionary rule is "a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment" 4 5 and concluded that " [t] One might ask why there is no police illegality if it is determined later that there was no probable cause to search. Has not a person's constitutional right been violated? Why is this not "police illegality"? In a very subtle sleight of hand the Supreme Court narrows the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is now directed to "police misconduct rather than to punish the errors ofjudges and magistrates." 5 1 Although an "illegality" occurs when the police search without a valid warrant, it is not police illegality, and therefore it is not illegality which is to be deterred by the exclusionary rule. A police officer's task is not to second-guess the magistrate. It is the magistrate's responsibility to issue search warrants. " 'Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the 46 Without any real support for its conclusion, the Court simply removes the exclusionary rule as a mechanism to prompt the magistrate to enforce fourth amendment rights. 54 The exclusionary rule no longer is intended to force compliance to the fourth amendment by all state officials, but is now only effective to deter police officials from committing fourth amendment violations.
But what is painfully missing from the Court's discussion in Leon is any real discussion of how the system can insure that the magistrate will perform his now virtually unreviewable duties. 5 5 In a footnote, the Court offers its single hope for containing errant magistrates: " 'It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar misconduct in the future by magistrates.' "56 The Supreme Court does not deny that illegality has occurred, and in fact, the Supreme Court calls on appellate courts to review the underlying fourth amendment issues even though their decision will not impact the [Vol. 77 LIMITING LEON admission of evidence in the cases before them. 57 A person's constitutional right to privacy, therefore, is to be safeguarded by the hope that an appellate court will review search and seizure cases notwithstanding its awareness that the outcome of the case will be unaffected by its decision. Justice White predicted that courts may resolve the underlying fourth amendment question before turning to the issue of good faith if "reviewing courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be informed of their errors." 5 8 This solution was Justice White's attempt to answer the argument that a good faith exception will "freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state." 59 The case law supports what common sense tells us busy courts will do: appellate courts will not always decide the good faith issue and often will refuse to issue advisory opinions on the underlying fourth amendment issue. 6 0 But even if Justice White were correct, his solution apparently does not preserve the exclusionary remedy in cases in which the magistrate is unaware of the appellate court's guidance or chooses not to follow the appellate court's decision. 
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The Court permits the application of the good faith exception in those situations in which the magistrate has not "abandoned his detached and neutral role." 6 1 Does a magistrate wholly abandon his judicial role if he is unaware of recent appellate decisions or chooses to distinguish away a particular court opinion? Even if his failure to keep current were held to be an abandonment of his judicial role, under the Supreme Court's view of the purpose of the exclusionary rule, one has to doubt whether exclusion of evidence is the proper remedy for the magistrate's error. If the exclusionary rule is truly effective only to alter police behavior, whether the magistrate has "wholly abandoned his judicial role" should only be relevant to exclusion if it appears to the police officer (the person to be deterred) that the magistrate has failed to act "magisterially." In such circumstances, "no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. ' "62 Unless a state uses its own constitution or statutes to fashion an exclusionary remedy different from that of the United States Supreme Court, 63 the federal constitutional right requires the application of the exclusionary rule only if the actions of the magistrate are objectively unreasonable in the eyes of the officer. As the Court wrote in Sheppard:
[w]hatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a warrant without knowing beforehand what items are to be seized, we refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.
Again, the oddity of the Court's decision comes to the fore: the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant guarantees that evidence seized pursuant to that warrant may be used unless the magistrate's mistake is so obvious that it would be recognizable by the officer on the beat. In effect, a magistrate's decision is "reviewable" only by the officers who sought the warrant! 65 This also appears to be the conclusion reached by Professor Alschuler, supra note 51, at 342, and by Professor LaFave, supra note 10, at 917.
[Vol. 77 516 LIMITING LEON with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake. "IT]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges." 66 The creation of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Leon and Sheppard must be viewed in the context of the reliance of an officer upon the judicial decision of a magistrate in issuing a search warrant. Although subsequent cases may read Leon and Sheppard for the broader proposition that a balancing test must be used in every case 6 7 to weigh the perceived deterrent effect against the harm to society when relevant information is excluded, Leon and Sheppard appear to mirror the policy considerations found in mistake of law cases with which the criminal law has wrestled for centuries. If Leon and Sheppard are to guide fourth amendment jurisprudence, the mistake of law analogy dictates that at the very least the good faith exception must be limited to searches incident to warrants. 68 
IV. MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RATIONALE OF THE COMMON LAW
Few principles in the criminal law are more firmly and consistently espoused than ignorantiajuris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat. 69 The common law has applied the principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense in varied situations, including those in which the actor's asserted lack of knowledge of the law was clearly out of step with the knowledge of the law in the general community. 7 0 The common law has also relied on the principle in situations in which the actor's ignorance was more understandable 7 ' and has even applied the principle in situations in which the actor could not have known the law. 72 In some situations ignorance or mistake of law may negate the statutorily defined mens rea requirement of a crime.
7 3 Even in jurisdictions in which mistake of law is irrelevant to issues of guilt, ignorance or mistake of law is viewed as a proper factor to be considered in sentencing.
74
The existence of the principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense is easy to document; it is somewhat more difficult to determine the rationale for the rule in its application. A number of justifications for the common law proposition that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense have been offered. Blackstone, who traced the development of the doctrine back to Roman law, 75 justified the principle on the basis that everyone is presumed to know the law. "For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of defense." 7 6
Blackstone's justification for the rule has been rejected by most commentators. 7 7 For example, Glanville Williams, after an extensive survey of the vast literature opposed to Blackstone's justification, concluded that " [t] he idea that the vast network of governmental controls can be known by everyone is today more ludicrous than ever." 78 Similar opposition to Blackstone is found in the writings of Jerome Hall. Austin explained the rule on the basis of the difficulty of disproving a person's ignorance. 8 0 Holmes answered Austin by pointing out that disproving a person's ignorance is no more difficult than many issues faced by courts. More cogent justifications for the principle center around the educative, standard-setting function of the criminal law.
8 2 Holmes' predilection for objective liability justified his rejection of a mistake of law defense:
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacrifices the individual to the 74 R. PERKINS Jerome Hall expounded on the use of the normative function for rejecting the mistake of law defense:
Now comes a defendant who truthfully pleads that he did not know that his conduct was criminal, implying that he thought it was legal. This may be because he did not know that any relevant legal prohibition existed (ignorance) or, if he did know any potentially relevant rule, that he decided it did not include his intended situation or conduct (mistake). In either case, such defenses always imply that the defendant thought he was acting legally. If that plea were valid, the consequences would be: whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, i.e. the law actually is thus and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites of a legal system, the implications of the principle of legality. LaFave and Scott also suggest that accepting a mistake of law defense would conflict with the principle of legality. That principle requires that "rules of law express objective meanings which are declared by competent officials." '8 6 Allowing an individual to determine the content of the law is opposed to the notion of a properly promulgated law equally binding upon all.
The common law, therefore, has concluded generally that ignorance or mistake of law will neither justify nor excuse the violation of the criminal law. The need to set community standards requires that the law not excuse conduct even if the actor did not realize that his actions were prohibited. The actor's mistake or ignorance may be considered in regard to punishment, but only if a reduced sentence would not undermine the required educative effect of the criminal law. Surely to reward an individual for being ignorant of the law would be counterproductive. There is, however, a subset of cases in which the common law has had difficulty applying its general proposition that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense. 
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criminal actions performed after the actor has received advice concerning the legality of his actions.
B.
RELIANCE UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
The common law infrequently has been faced with situations in which a criminal defendant sought advice as to an act's legality from a government official, private counsel or other source before committing the criminal act. The case law has remained fairly consistent in denying a defense of reliance upon the advice of private counsel. 8 7 However, the few courts which have wrestled with the prosecution of a defendant who has relied on the advice of a public official have reached differing results. These cases tend to fall into three general fact patterns. First, there are those cases in which the defendant was indiscriminate in seeking out a public official for advice. For example, in Jones v. State, s8 the defendant was convicted of operating his saloon on election day. The defendant sought to justify his actions on the ground that an officer told him he could open his saloon after the polls had closed. 8 9 In upholding the conviction the court concluded that "[i]gnorance of a law cannot be pleaded injustification of its violation." 90 Courts have consistently rejected the mistake of law defense in cases within this first category. 9 1 Second, there are those cases in which a defendant seeks advice from an official who arguably has some special responsibility for enforcing or administering the law. Often these cases result in an acceptance of the defense of reliance upon the governmental advice. In Raley v. Ohio, 9 2 Raley was brought before the Ohio Un-American Activities Committee to answer questions about subversive activities in the labor movement. The Committee told Raley that he had a right to remain silent under the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Ohio Constitution. 93 Raley was eventually prosecuted for not responding to the Committee's question and his conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. [
The witness knew or is presumed to know the law and "cannot be heard to say in one breath that he knows enough of the law to claim the privilege against self-incrimination and in the next breath that he knows nothing of the immunity statute, or that he has misconstrued it."96 In reversing Raley's conviction, eight members of the United States Supreme Court held:
While there is no suggestion that the Commission had any intent to deceive the appellants, we repeat that to sustain the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on such a basis after the Commission had acted as it did would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the state-convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the state clearly told him was available to him. In Cox v. Louisiana, 98 the Supreme Court relied upon Raley to overturn convictions of demonstrators who had demonstrated "near" a courthouse. 9 9 The convictions were reversed because the "highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor" told the demonstrators that they could meet if they remained 101 feet from the courthouse steps.' 0 0
Perhaps the most famous case falling in the category of mistake of law defenses arising from advice from a public official is United States v. Barker,' 0 1 one of the Watergate cases. In Barker, the defendants Barker and Martinez argued successfully to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that they were entitled to a jury instruction on a limited mistake of law defense.1 0 2 Two judges adopted the basic premise that Barker and Martinez should be able to defend charges that they conspired to violate the civil rights of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by proving that they had relied upon the authority of E. Howard Hunt to authorize the break-in. Although the two judges in the majority took slightly different approaches to the mistake of law issue, 1 03 both judges relied upon 
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Hunt's past CIA experience with the defendants and Hunt's relationship to Erlichman and the White House from which he had at least apparent authority to issue orders for the burglary.
04
The third category of mistake of law defenses are those cases in which a defendant acts upon the advice or opinion of a public official whose duty it is to interpret the law. It is this category of cases which is most directly relevant to an analysis of Leon, in which the police officer relied upon an official interpretation of the fourth amendment by a magistrate.
C.
RELIANCE UPON AN OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
The Common Law Cases
Reliance upon an official interpretation of the law surfaces in the common law in two major fact patterns. The first pattern is exemplified by State v. Davis 1 0 5 and involves reliance upon non-judicial opinions regarding the substance of the law. Davis was convicted of accepting ajob of airport manager at a time when he was a member of the County Board of Supervisors. Prior to accepting the position, Davis sought advice from the Corporation Counsel and the Assistant District Attorney, 1 0 6 both of whom approved Davis' acceptance of the position. Davis was convicted of violating a Wisconsin statute, but his conviction was overturned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
[W]e do not fault the general rule... that ignorance of the law shall provide no defense .... It is our opinion that a blind application of such a rule would violate the principle of "fundamental fairness" implicit in our jurisprudence system. The prosecution of an individual who relies on the legal opinion of a governmental official who is statutorily required to so opine would, in our opinion, impose an unconscionable rigidity in the law.1 0 7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in keeping with the intention of the Model Penal Code, limited the mistake of law defense to reliance 104 In dissent, Judge Leventhal strongly criticized the application of the official interpretation doctrine and its variants to the Watergate burglars.
The official misstatement of law defense embodies a fundamental requirement that the erroneous interpretation be made by an official in fact possessing the power to make a binding interpretation; it is wholly inapplicable to a case like this, of a claim of reliance on a government official in an area in which he has no power to interpret. And it is a blatant incongruity to stretch an escape clause for mistakes of law arising in the innately public business of official interpretations of law to immunize a secret conference for planning a stealthy entry into a private home or office. Although this first fact pattern is not directly analogous to Leon, it will be useful later in the discussion of limitations to be placed upon Leon. A second pattern is formed by those cases in which an actor has relied upon a statute or a judicial decision which subsequently is determined to be unconstitutional, illegal or wrong. This fact pattern is directly analogous to the Leon problem. In terms of reliance upon judicial decisions, two issues have risen. The first issue is whether it is reasonable to rely upon a lower court decision which has not yet reached the highest appellate court. 110 Appellate courts have generally found such reliance to be reasonable."' The second issue is whether one can reasonably rely on a court decision in a case in which the actor was not a party."1 2 The case law has generally held that reliance upon a lower court decision, even by a non-party, is reasonable and will be accepted as a defense to a criminal prosecution.
3
The Model Penal Code Approach
In its attempt to resolve issues raised in the official interpretation category, the Model Penal Code has tended to follow the common law and has adopted limited exceptions to the basic principle that mistake of law is no defense. It is these exceptions which are helpful in analyzing Leon. Section 2.04(3), "Ignorance or Mistake as a Defense," provides:
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: Although many states have relied generally upon the Model Penal Code in statutory revisions" 9 or in fashioning judicial opinions, 120 section 2.04(3) has not been universally embraced. Even though some revised criminal codes have incorporated subsection 3(b) in its entirety,' 2 ' and some courts have adopted subsection 3(b) by decision, 2 2 other states have made rather serious changes to the Model Penal Code proposal. Arizona, for example, specifically rejected subsection 3(b) and allows a mistake of law defense only if the conduct was authorized by the direction of a court. 
Rationales for the Common Law and Model Penal Code Approaches to Reliance Upon Official Interpretation
Three separate but interrelated reasons support the adoption of a mistake of law defense in situations in which the actor relied upon an official statement of the law: 1) the lack of culpability of the actor; 2) the "entrapment" of the actor by the state; and 3) the need to encourage actors to seek official guidance.
Some sources justify the limited mistake of law defense on the basis that the actor who relies upon an official statement of the law is not a person upon whom the criminal law should operate-the person is not criminally culpable for his acts. The commentary to the Model Penal Code makes this point:
All of the categories dealt with in the formulation involve, for the most part, situations where the act charged is consistent with the en- The culpability rationale has been used to justify the formulation of section 609 of the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.
1 25 The official commentary to section 609 explains the rationale for the rule: Section [609] provides a defense (unless a law expressly provides otherwise) for a person (a) who has taken affirmative steps to assure himself that conduct in which he proposes to engage will not violate the law and (b) who, as a result of having taken such steps and in reliance on whatever information he may already have had, believes reasonably and firmly that the conduct will not violate the law. Such a person should not incur criminal liability. With respect to the law, his conduct is not culpable, within the framework of a system of definite positive laws. He has done all that can reasonably be expected to conform his conduct to the law. There is no room for deterrence in such circumstances without either imposing on persons an unreasonable burden to study the law or, in effect, limiting their conduct more broadly than the criminal law intends to do.' 2 6
Section 610 was not adopted by Congress in the Crime Control Act of 1984.127
Judge Bazelon, in circumstances such as Barker, would equate the rationale for a limited mistake of law defense as not significantly departing from the principle of "conventional morality which finds recognition in the defense of mistake of fact."' 28 Bazelon concludes that "[t]o effect retribution upon an individual without consideration of his state of mind seems too barbarous for discussion and in any event the law has moved beyond retribution as a prime justification for the criminal sanction."' . 1985) , the court relied upon § 610 to deny a mistake of law defense where the defendant had urged that his mistake of law was based upon a legal brief filed in a separate case. 
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not be totally justified on the culpability of the actor. The Model Penal Code defense excludes total ignorance of the law and reliance upon unofficial advice as defenses even though the reliance may be as reasonable, in some circumstances, as reliance upon an official interpretation.
30
In Fletcher's words, the Model Penal Code is more accurately premised on a notion resembling the defense of reliance upon superior orders. 1 3 ' By ignoring many sources of mistaken information justifying a defendant's actions, the Model Penal Code introduces a concept of "reasonableness" and thereby negates a rationale which relies solely on the personal culpability of the actor.
Related to the culpability rationale for the Model Penal Code defense is the entrapment rationale: By relying on official advice, the actor has been trapped into acting. Although one cannot form a firm conclusion concerning the reason why some state legislatures chose to adopt subsection 3(b) of the Model Penal Code while others rejected or substantially amended the provision, a few courts which have relied upon subsection 3(b) have given an insight into their view of the purpose of the subsection. Some recent cases see the mistake of law defense as "the criminal analogue of estoppel."' 13 2 It is unfair to punish an actor who has been "entrapped" by the information provided by a public official. In some ways the actor seems less culpable because he has been encouraged to commit the act. Entrapment, however, includes something in addition to lessened culpability; entrapment includes the notion that it is unseemly for government to act in this way. But the entrapment rationale suffers some of the same difficulties as the culpability rationale. It may be just as unfair to punish a person who is "entrapped" by any public official as it is to punish a person who is "entrapped" by an official who falls within the rubric of subsection 3(b).
A third rationale, encouraging people to seek advice from a limited group of public officials, seems best to justify the common law and Model Penal Code's mistake of law defense. It is also this rationale which best justifies the Supreme Court's decision in Leon.
In Ostrosky v. State, 13 3 the defendant was convicted of fishing without a valid limited entry permit. In post-conviction relief, Ostrosky successfully had the fishing statute held unconstitutional. Os-trosky continued to fish. 13 4 The constitutionality of the fishing statute was eventually upheld by the Alaska Supreme Court, 3 5 and Ostrosky was tried for his second fishing expedition. 3 6 In allowing a limited defense based upon Ostrosky's mistake of law as to the fishing violation, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that Ostrosky was entitled to rely upon the trial court's decision that the statute was unconstitutional. "The policy behind this rule is to encourage people to learn and know the law; a contrary rule would reward intentional ignorance of the law."' 3 7 The court of appeals rejected the state's argument that it is unreasonable, as a matter of law, for a person to rely on a decision of a trial court.' 3 8
In order to accept this rationale of the encouragement of seeking information, one must first posit that society wants to encourage its citizens to seek information from public officials before acting. Society pays a price by acknowledging any form of mistake of law defense but also pays a price, in terms of public perception of fairness, if the law fails to account in some way and in some circumstances for a mistake of law. It is not unfair to punish individuals if society wants to discourage people from seeking information from public officials or warns its citizens that the information is gratuitous and will have no subsequent impact on prosecution. One must posit that encouraging citizens to seek clarification from public officials outweighs any erosion of the authority of the legislature that such a defense may cause. One must also posit that the benefit of the limited mistake of law defense outweighs the benefit which society gains when it encourages persons not to act in those situations in which there is doubt as to the legality of the particular act.
The Model Penal Code chose to encourage citizens to seek legal advice, even though that advice subsequently may be found to be erroneous and therefore in conflict with a legislative decision. The Model Penal Code drafters decided to "reward" the misinformed citizen in a way in which it does not reward the truly ignorant or the person who has sought advice from someone outside the 1261 (1978) , in which the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant could rely upon an unappealed trial court judgment striking down a massage parlor ordinance as unconstitutional. A person could rely upon the trial court's decision until "the publication of this opinion" in which the appellate court upheld the regulation of massage parlors. Id. at 597, 380 N.E.2d at 1268.
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"official" spectrum. In other words, the Model Penal Code rejected a defense that would excuse conduct if the actor was unaware of the illegality of his act or was mistaken as to the illegality of his act because he relied on a reasonable source of information. Rather, the Code adopted a defense which encourages potential actors to seek information from a limited number of sources before acting. By noting the similarity between the mistake of law defense and the good faith exception in Leon, and by acknowledging that the mistake of law defense intends to reward persons who seek official advice, one can focus on the wisdom of the Court's decision in Leon and suggest ways in which Leon should be interpreted.
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ANALOGY
A. IDENTIFYING A RATIONALE FOR LEON
Three possible justifications for the Court's creation of a good faith exception in Leon come to the fore when one analyzes Leon in terms of the rationales for a limited mistake of law defense in the official interpretation situation. First, it can be argued that excluding evidence when the officer gathered evidence in reliance upon a warrant is punishing the officer undeservedly. 13 9 Second, excluding evidence when the officer relied on a warrant is unfair, just as it was unfair to punish Raley for contempt after he relied upon official advice. 140 An officer should not be punished because he has received official advice which has entrapped him into conducting an illegal search; it is unseemly for a government to trick persons into violating the law. 14 ' Third, by acknowledging a mistake of law defense, society encourages persons to seek information before acting and by allowing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when the search is pursuant to a warrant, society encourages police to seek official guidance regarding the existence of probable cause. 14 2
The justification for a limited mistake of law defense based on a lack of culpability is inapplicable to Leon for a number of reasons. First, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy directed personally to the police officer.' 43 The exclusionary rule is an institutional rem- 139 See supra text accompanying notes 110-13. 140 See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) ; supra text accompanying note 16. 141 See supra text accompanying note 132. 142 See supra text accompanying notes 133-38. 143 It is never totally clear who justice White believes the exclusionary rule acts on as a deterrent:
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.... But even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the 528 [Vol. 77 LIMITING LEON edy. 144 It is directed at the state in its prosecutorial function. 14 5 The due process issues raised by the Supreme Court in Raley 1 4 6 are simply inapplicable to Leon. Unlike Raley, in which the actor was led to believe his course of conduct was proper and then was punished for his actions, in Leon it is not the actor (the police officer), but rather the state which suffers the consequences of the police officer's actions when the evidence gathered pursuant to an invalid warrant is excluded. It is irrelevant whether the officer exhibits the degree of culpability for which the criminal law seeks punishment. In fact, the officer is not to be punished at all.
The mistake of law analysis of Leon, however, shows quite clearly the impact that would be felt if the exclusionary rule were replaced by a remedy directed to the individual police officer. 147 If the remedy for a fourth amendment violation was personal and noninstitutional, 148 issues of fairness from Raley 1 4 9 and issues of reliance from Ostrosky1 5 0 would become relevant as to penalties aslaw enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argues that the exclusionary rule is primarily an institutional remedy:
The flaw in the Court's argument, however, is that its logic captures only one comparatively minor element of the generally acknowledged deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. To be sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own cases. But what the Court overlooks is that the deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of "punishment" of individual police officers for their failure to obey the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.... Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies generally. Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over the long term, [the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary rule] that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492. It is only through such an institution wide mechanism that information concerning Fourth Amendment standards can be effectively communicated to rank and file officers. Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 144 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting 
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sessed against the individual officer. One need merely look to United States v. Screws 15 ' and its progeny 152 to anticipate the difficulties which may result if the primary remedy for fourth amendment violations is directed to the officer in his individual capacity and not in his capacity as a representative of the state. In a similar vein, the entrapment unfairness rationale for Leon must be dismissed. It is not unseemly to suppress evidence as long as the remedy for a violation of the fourth amendment remains institutional and is not addressed to the personal interests of the individual police officer. In fact, one can argue that it is indeed very seemly for a government to provide a review procedure which recognizes the importance of a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and thereby reinforces the importance of such rights. The government is not entrapping officers to violate the law and then punishing the officer. The government is merely recognizing that its agent (the magistrate) may have committed an error and now the state is providing a remedy for review of that decision. If it is impossible to review the magistrate's decision prior to the search, a post-search review may conclude that the search was illegal. In short, it is not unfair, nor is it unseemly, to deny the state the use of evidence when that evidence has been seized by its agent contrary to law. One may argue that on balance it is unwise to exclude the evidence, but it is not unfair to either the state or the individual officer to do so.
The third justification for Leon which emerges from a mistake of law analysis is that by recognizing the good faith exception, one is "encouraging people to learn and know the law."' 153 The Court's decision in Leon can be seen as a method of encouraging police officers to seek warrants before searches. This reading of Leon analogizes a police officer's seeking and executing a warrant to an individual's acting pursuant to a court decision later found to be erroneous.
The educative justification for Leon is more convincing than either the reliance or entrapment justifications, but it is not without its problems. The major difficulty with this justification for Leon is that it assumes that police need to be encouraged to obtain warrants. 
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[Vol. 77 LIMITING LEON law presently holds that searches without warrants are presumptively illegal.' 5 5 Therefore, the encouragement that Leon can provide is only necessary either in situations where it is unclear whether a warrant is necessary' 5 6 or where there is concern that the police may fabricate facts to justify an exception to the warrant requirement.' 5 7 Also, police may need additional encouragement to seek warrants in those situations in which they presently conduct unconstitutional searches, knowing that standing requirements, 158 the use of the evidence (other than in the prosecutor's case-in-chief)' 5 9 or plea bargaining 160 will make their efforts worthwhile. For Leon to be effective as an incentive to secure a warrant, the added benefit of obtaining a warrant must be seen to outweigh the perceived inconvenience of the paperwork and the warrant application process.
Police may well view Leon as reducing the ambiguity of search and seizure law. An officer may bring an application to a magistrate knowing that if the magistrate finds the application faulty, the officer . 156 There are many reasons which might lead to police uncertainty as to the need for a warrant. First the fourth amendment case law is continually in a state of flux. For example, in Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 469 U.S. 979 (1985) , the Court voted four to four, thereby affirming the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, that police officers were constitutionally required to obtain a search warrant before the police removed a suitcase from a the trunk of a car in which suspected drugs were located. In addition, state supreme courts appear more willing than ever to interpret their own state constitutions inconsistently with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976)(rejecting the standard for warrantless automobile inventories); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984)(rejecting Gates standard). Therefore police officers may find that they are subject to two separate bodies of constitutional law regarding search and seizure, thus contributing to their uncertainty.
157 The untruthful police officer may be able to avoid the rigors of the fourth amendment, and this possibility has always caused the system some degree of consternation. 
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will have an opportunity to correct the deficiency. Also, the officer knows that if the magistrate issues a search warrant, the evidence will most likely be admissible at trial since the magistrate's decision is virtually unreviewable. If the police perceive Leon as an "insurance policy" against subsequent appellate attack, the decision will encourage more warrants and will reduce perjured testimony (e.g., testimony offered to show that there was an exigency justifying a warrantless search). Leon may also be an incentive for the officer to secure a warrant if the officer realizes that because of the good faith exception of Leon and the relaxed probable cause standards of Gates 161 a legally unassailable warrant may be easier to obtain. The state may therefore be in a better plea bargaining position, or the prosecution may be able to use the seized evidence in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. The standing rules, however, still act as a disincentive to the officer to search only on probable cause, whether the search is warranted or warrantless.
The benefit of Leon in these limited cases must be balanced against the fact that despite the good faith exception of Leon, an individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated with no apparent remedy. The failure to remedy the wrong sends a message to the community regarding fourth amendment rights: certain constitutional rights are limited by the knowledge of the police officer. To this extent, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule undercuts the standard setting function of the law. In the words of Justice Stevens in Leon, the creation of the good faith exception "is to convert a bill of Rights into an unenforced honor code."' 162
B. LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF LEON TO WARRANTED SEARCHES
If one assumes that there is a need to encourage the police to learn the law by seeking warrants (and therefore Leon was correctly decided), the analogous use of the Model Penal Code official interpretation doctrine gives an insight into the limitations which courts should place upon Leon. Section 2.04(3)(b) of the Model Penal Code contains four types of official pronouncements which can serve as a basis for a mistake of law defense. In addition to reliance upon "a judicial decision, opinion or judgment," ( The Leon principle "arguably applies to the consent search, making suppression improper where an officer has searched in good faith reliance on the validity of a consent which he has received."); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 734, -, 342 S.E.2d 789, 795 (1986)(although defendant was subjected to warrantless blood test, officer relied on nontestimonial identification order, so suppression inapplicable. "We decline to apply the exclusionary rule to this good faith violation of the fourth amendment. To apply the rule here would not serve to discourage police misconduct the primary function of deciding whether a search may be constitutionally conducted. The independent, neutral magistrate issues an order-the warrant-which is a judgment that there is probable cause to search a particular place for particular items. The decision is made as a "judicial decision, opinion or judgment"' 16 8 even though it may "afterward [be] determined to be invalid or erroneous." 169 In a limited number of cases, Leon should be applied to evidence seized pursuant to a statute later held to be unconstitutional. This corresponds to the second category of the Model Penal Code section 2.04 "reliance upon a statute or other enactment." In cases preceding Leon, such as Michigan v. De Fillippo,°7 0 the Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances evidence seized by police pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional will not be suppressed.' 7 1 In De Fillippo, a defendant was arrested under a Detroit ordinance which made it unlawful for a person stopped under suspicious circumstances to refuse to identify himself. In a search pursuant to the arrest, drugs were found on the defendant. 72 LIMITING LEON This limitation placed upon De Fillippo is consistent with Leon and with the analogous use of section 2.04(3)(b)(1), 7 5 because the legislature is not the interpreter of the Constitution and therefore cannot alter constitutional safeguards by statute. Yet, the legislature is the definer of criminal conduct which may lead to a police officer's deciding he has probable cause to arrest an individual for a crime defined by the legislature.
1 7 6 In De Fillippo, the legislature was operating within its area of authority. In cases such as Ybarra v. linois, 17 7 in which the legislature tried to define fourth amendment rules, the legislature was not operating within its area of authority, and this evidence should continue to be excluded after Leon. 17 8 In addition to reliance upon a statute, the Model Penal Code also permits reliance upon an "other enactment"' 179 as a basis of a mistake of law defense. It is conceivable, although neither the Model Penal Code's commentary' 80 nor the case lawl s ' give any guidance on the issue, that "other enactment" includes administrative regulations formally adopted through an administrative procedure. 18 2 If an agency regulation may serve as a basis for a mistake of law defense under section 2.04(3) (b) (iii), may police regulations concerning searches and seizures serve as a basis for a good faith Peltier, the Court refused to suppress evidence seized by Border Patrol agents who acted pursuant to a federal statute later declared unconstitutional. As the Court noted, "It was in reliance upon a validly enacted statute [8 U.S.C. § 1357(9)(3)], supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval, that Border Patrol agents stopped and searched respondent's automobile." Id. at 541. The Court reasoned that judicial integrity was not "offended" because "the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial." Id. at 537. 175 See supra text accompanying note 114. 176 See LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in An Imperfect World, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 349 (1982) .
177 444 U.S. 85 (1979) . In Ybarra, an Illinois statute authorized searches of any persons found on premises searched pursuant to a search warrant. In striking down the statute and ordering that the seized evidence be suppressed, the Court refrained from discussing any issues relating to a good faith reliance by the officer upon the Illinois statute. Id. at 90-96.
178 It seems inappropriate considering the Leon Court's comments in De Fillippo to attempt to characterize a legislature under § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) as a "public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation" of the fourth amendment. 179 See supra text accompanying note 114. 180 The Model Penal Code Commentary to § 2.04(3)(b)(iii) does not define "other enactment."
181 A search of the case law has found no cases interpreting the provision. 182 "Other enactments" might also include administrative interpretations of rules of evidence, as was the situation in a series of cases recently decided by the Third Circuit. According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(i), disclosure of grand jury matters is allowed "when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had used this rule to request disclosure of grand jury transcripts and other documents for use in tax audits against As long as the magistrate does not rely on an affidavit which is knowingly or recklessly false, 20 3 does not act as an "adjunct law enforcement officer," 20 4 and does not base probable cause on a "bare bones" affidavit, 20 5 the practical outcome of Leon is to make the magistrate's decision unreviewable. 2 0 6 Nothing in the Court's opinion is directed to the serious question of magistrate quality. It is not sufficient that a magistrate is "neutral and detached." A magistrate, particularly a magistrate whose decisions on issues of constitutional law are unreviewable, must be "informed and current" not just "neutral and detached. ' 20 7 The need for an informed magistracy raises the far reaching question of whether our legal system is willing to allow questions regarding constitutional rights to be made by persons with no legal training whose decisions are virtually unreviewable. If the answer is that we are willing to accept such unreviewable decisions on search and seizures issues, we must reconsider the issue of lay magistrates and magistrate qualifications in general raised in Shadwick v. City of Tampa 20 8 and North v. Russell. 20 9 In Shadwick, a unanimous Court held that municipal court clerks could constitutionally issue arrest warrants. "These clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." 2 10 "We find no commandment... that all warrant authority must reside exclusively in a lawyer or judge." 2 11 The issuing magistrate must meet two tests: he must be neutral and detached, and "he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." 21 2 Although it might be more desirable to have the decision to issue a warrant made by a judge or a lawyer, such requirements are not constitutionally mandated. 21 3 However, it must be noted at the time of the Court's decision in Shadwick, determinations of probable cause were subject to the scrutiny of Aguilar-Spinelli, and an officer's reliance on a warrant did not make the decision to issue the warrant unreviewable in a subsequent adversarial proceeding.
In North v. Russell, 2 1 5 North argued that the right to counsel discussed in Argesinger v. Hamlin 2 16 and Gideon v. Wainwright 2 1 7 was meaningless unless a law-trained judge was required to rule on counsel's arguments. 21 8 In upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky's two-tier trial court system, Chief Justice Burger relied upon the fact that a person sentenced to imprisonment by a non-lawtrained judge had a right to a de novo trial before a law-trained judge if the individual chose to exercise that right. 2 19 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Stewart argued that a judge ignorant of the law is incapable of performing functions required by the due process clause. 220 Justice Stewart said he could not agree that "these constitutional deficiencies can all be swept under the rug and forgotten because the convicted defendant may have a trial de novo before a qualified judge. ' 
1
In both Shadwick and North, the Court relied on the fact that decisions by non-law-trained individuals were reviewable. A system which makes such decisions unreviewable must be concerned with the quality of these decisions. An unreviewable system is likely to make the least stringent magistrate the busiest magistrate. An unreviewable system based on police good faith may also mean that prosecutors may no longer screen warrant applications, possibly in part because they may realize that their review might impugn an officer's good faith if the review indicates legal problems with the warrant application. 2 22 Some court systems, relying on the unreviewability of the magistrate's decision, may even take Leon as a signal to hire issuing magistrates who are less law-trained than present magistrates, believing that they will be more readily directed by the police.
2 23 Although requiring that issuing magistrates be lawtrained is no guarantee that a magistrate will be informed and his knowledge current, there is a greater likelihood that this will be
